Sep 28 2006
How to handle those nutty kicking situations
Recent gaffes by the Panthers’ Chris Gamble and the Steelers’ Ricardo Colclough and the incredible starts to the season that John Kasay and Robbie Gould have had are bringing the importance of good special teams play back to the forefront early in the season. It’s also given coaches, players and pundits the opportunity to examine how to handle certain special teams situations.
For example, teams like to call time out before their opponents attempt last-second field goals — an obvious attempt to ice the kicker. Turns out that’s not such a good idea. As we found out from Jason Elam and Mike Shanahan earlier this week, the kickers actually like it when opponents call timeout:
On Sunday, Elam missed a 44-yard attempt through a strong crosswind against Kansas City in the first half at Invesco Field, but nailed a 39-yarder through the same uprights in overtime for a 9-6 Denver win.
“On that last one, it was kind of nice when Kansas City called a timeout. I was able to go out there, see what the wind was doing, see what the plant foot area was like,” Elam said.
And visualize the ball going through the uprights.
“It is kind of funny. I don’t know where all that started,” Elam said. “But I love it when they call timeout. If they didn’t, maybe I would call my own timeout.”
So if you really want to get to a good kicker, make him set up and kick the ball as quickly as possible. Gotcha.
The special teams talk has also allowed Gregg Easterbrook, ESPN’s Tuesday Morning Quarterback, to drag out a favorite strawman of his — the idea that punting the ball on 4th-down, short-yardage situations is a bad idea perpetuated by blame-shifting coaches afraid for their jobs.
Think about all those punts on fourth-and-1, fourth-and-2, fourth-and-3. The average NFL offensive play gains about five yards. Yet game in, game out, coaches boom the punt away on short yardage, handing the most precious article in football — possession of the ball — to the other side. Nearly three-quarters of fourth-and-1 attempts succeed, while around one-third of possessions result in scores. Think about those fractions. Go for it four times on fourth-and-1 — odds are you will keep the ball three times, and three kept possessions each with a one-third chance of a score results in your team scoring once more than it otherwise would have. Punt the ball on all four fourth-and-1s, and you’ve given the opponents three additional possessions. (It would have gotten one possession anyway when you missed one of your fourth-and-1s.) Those three extra possessions, divided by the one-third chance to score, give the opponent an extra score.
Bottom line? If you face fourth-and-1 four times and punt all four times, your opponent will score once more than it otherwise would have. If you go for it all four times, you will score once more than you otherwise would have.
Of course, Easterbrook supplies plenty of caveats — never go for it inside your own 20, for example — but he suggests that coaches don’t do this because they don’t want to risk the avalanche of criticism from ownership, writers, sports radio callers, and bloggers if their team fails to convert on 4th down in a crucial situation. They want to protect their jobs and shift the blame to their players.
Considering how often coaches get fired in the NFL, that seems pretty pointless, doesn’t it? After all, if a coach really believes in his players and his system, why shouldn’t he show some confidence in them? Why should he be afraid to stand up like Jim Fassel did six years ago and say, “This team is going to the playoffs?”
It’s an interesting idea. Too bad no NFL coach will ever try to make it work…
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